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OPTIONS, ORPHANS OF THE LAW
By PHILIP G. DUFFORD*
INTRODUCTION
H ISTORICALLY, the real estate option agreement has been
an orphan passed back and forth by the established house-
holds of contract and real property law. Most present day
real estate sales are based, in the first instance, on option ar-
rangements. Many of the sales involve great sums of money.
Despite the frequency and economic scope of such transactions,
however, option agreements and the rights of the parties in-
volved therein are somewhat nebulous. The option contract is,
in the eyes of many, a "noncontract," and the enforceable
rights and duties it may or may not create often seem fragile
in the face of legal attack. Consider these comments about
option agreements which appear in Thompson on Real Property:
One who has a legal right but not a duty to buy land or other
property holds an option. . . . It is merely an agreement to hold
an offer to sell property open for a specified time. A "binding
option" for the purchase of land is a contract, but it is also an
offer, which, when accepted, will create another contract ...
An option is not an actual or existing contract, but merely
a right reserved in subsisting agreement. It is a continuing
offer of a contract .... The option is not a sale. It is not even
an agreement for a sale. At best, it is but a right of election in
the party securing the same to exercise a privilege, and only
when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it
become a contract to sell.'
Such statements are common and correct summaries of the
law applicable to option arrangements. They are, in most in-
stances, reflective of general law on the subject and, more
specifically, of Colorado law.
In Colorado, decisions dealing with option arrangements
have flowed from the appellate level since 1880, and at this
point in time there are at least 50 cases within the Colorado
reports. Despite this sizeable body of law dealing with options,
those arrangements are often created and entered into with
comparatively little concern or legal forethought. It is the pri-
mary purpose of this article to accumulate the Colorado cases
* Partner, Welborn, Dufford, Cook, Phipps & Brown, Denver, Colorado;
J.D., 1952, University of Colorado. Virtually all of the research for this
article was done by John A. Dates of Welborn, Dufford, Cook, Phipps &
Brown. Thus, credit for the article's accurate and comprehensive docu-
mentation belongs to him.
1 8A. G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 4443 (repl. 1963)
(emphasis added).
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dealing with options and to highlight their impact as an aid
to the creation, exercise, and enforcement of these nebulous
agreements.
I. CREATING THE OPTION
Because courts look upon options as unilateral contracts,
binding only the optionor until exercise of the option, they are
strictly construed against the optionee. 2 Moreover, the impact
of the option's terms is generally viewed as a question of law
which an appellate court may resolve without being bound
by findings and conclusions made at the trial level.3
These strictures, as well as common sense, demand that the
agreement should be clear and definitive in its terms.4 Cer-
tainly parties, consideration,5 property descriptions, term,7 and
especially the manner in which the option may be exercised"
should be definitively set forth. The option must, of course, be
in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, unless one prefers to
live his life the dangerous way and hopes to satisfy the statute
through proof of part performance.9
Payment of adequate consideration for the option is of
particular significance.10  Without the receipt of a good and
valuable consideration for his grant of an option, the optionor
has made only an offer to which there is no existing mutual
obligation on the part of the optionee. 1I This offer, therefore,
can be withdrawn by the optionor at any time before accept-
ance. The optionee's acceptance, however, is rigidly required to
be in strict accordance with the terms of the agreement.
12
Recital of consideration is not, by itself, enough to make the
2 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963); Rude v. Levy,
43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908); T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert
Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo. App. 1970- not selected for official
publication).
3 Boulder Co. v. Poor, 497 P.2d 1281 (Colo. App. 1972-not selected for
official publication). See also Meier v. Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 164
Colo. 25, 431 P.2d 1019 (1967).
4 Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P.2d 161 (1944).
5 Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo. 302 (1880).
6 Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo. 129, 314 P.2d 707 (1957).
7 Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960).
8 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 321, 390 P.2d 313, 318 (1964). This case
is interesting in that the omission as to the manner of exercise in the
agreement was cured by the optionee tendering the full purchase
price.
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1-8 to -9; Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo. 129,
133, 314 P.2d 707, 709 (1957); Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P.2d
161 (1944); Boyd v. McElroy, 105 Colo. 527, 100 P.2d 624 (1940).
10 Stanton v. Union Oil Co., 111 Colo. 414, 420, 142 P.2d 285, 288 (1943);
Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo. 302 (1880).
11 Gray v. Quiller, 144 Colo. 54, 355 P.2d 99 (1960).
12 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5
Colo. 302 (1880), are the leading cases on this point in Colorado.
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option irrevocable.13
The sanctity conferred by the payment of adequate con-
sideration can be lost if the optionee has the right to compel
repayment of his consideration in the event he does not exer-
cise the option. 4 However, the enforceability of the option is
not destroyed if, upon exercise of the option, the consideration
for the option is to become a credit against the purchase price.15
An unconditional obligation to pay an option consideration
in installments may also satisfy the consideration requirement,
but this is treading dangerous ground.16
Whatever infirmities may exist as to the initial adequacy of
consideration, Colorado courts (unlike some) have consistently
held that once the optionee unequivocally accepts the offer of
sale and obligates himself to purchase the optioned property,
the initial failure of consideration is no longer significant. The
optionor cannot thereafter refuse to perform because of the
original lack of mutuality in the contract.
17
Creating the option arrangement also requires care to avoid
constructing either a firm purchase and sale contract or a
security arrangement. If the enforceability of the agreement
hinges upon the occurrence of an external condition rather than
upon the optionee's election, a conditional but otherwise mutu-
ally enforceable agreement- not an option-is created.'
8
Where options are constructed so that the optionee enters
into possession and use of the property, usually under a lease
arrangement, and thereafter pays substantial amounts of money
in order to retain his interest in the property, the Colorado
Supreme Court has tended to view the agreement as a purchase
and sale contract. Since the doctrine of equitable conversion
applies in Colorado, finding such a contract means also finding
a security arrangement. 19 The seller who continues to hold
13 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908).
14See Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849
(1960); Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo. 89 (1881).
15 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963).
16 Helmericks v. Hotter, 30 Colo. App. 242, 492 P.2d 85 (1971).
17Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318 (1882), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo.
302 (1880), are the early cases on this point. Stanton v. Union Oil Co.,
111 Colo. 414, 142 P.2d 285 (1943), is a more recent case containing a
discussion as to when mutuality of obligation arises.
18 Tallman v. Smith, 112 Colo. 217, 148 P.2d 581 (1944). See also Gould
v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960); Rocky
Mountain Gold Mines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten, Inc., 104 Colo.
478, 93 P.2d 973 (1939); Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 165 P. 265
(1917); In re Gauthier, 493 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1972-not selected for
official publication).
19 Konecny v. von Gunten, 151 Colo. 376, 379 P.2d 158 (1963).
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legal title is viewed as retaining a security right in the prop-
erty. The overall effect of such agreements, therefore, is that
the "optionor" holds a security interest and must proceed by
foreclosure if there is default by the "optionee.12 0 The practical
result of such a foreclosure requirement is that the optionee
need not forfeit all of his "consideration" for the agreement.
Similarily, where options to acquire title to property are given
for the essential purpose of guaranteeing the payment of money
by the "optionee," the Colorado courts view the overall trans-
action as a security arrangement. 2
1
Whether a resultant agreement is or is not an option, as
opposed to a contract of purchase and sale, can be of particular
interest to the realtors who might be involved in the trans-
action. Absent an agreement to the contrary, if the agreement
is an option, the realtor's commission is unearned and remains
unearned if the option is not exercised.
22
Considering the tendency of some purported option agree-
ments to migrate into the purchase contract or security arrange-
ment families and to make their presence felt within the homes
of brokerage or agency agreements, one has to speculate about
the true blood bond of the so-called "Receipt and Option Agree-
ment" forms, commonly a part of modern real estate trans-
actions. Although these forms vary considerably in their terms,
the one most commonly used is that which carries the written
endorsement of the Colorado Real Estate Commission. The cur-
rent printing of this form is a hasty pudding type of instrument
with something in it for the prospective seller, buyer, and
realtor.
The agreement is constructed on a basis which normally
results in the prospective purchaser delivering a specified sum
as "earnest money" to the realtor who holds a "listing" for the
sale of given property. The owner of the property then has a
20 Compare Rocky Mountain Goldmines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten,
Inc., 104 Colo. 478, 93 P.2d 973 (1939), and Fairview Mining Corp. v.
American Mines & Smelting Co., 86 Colo. 77, 278 P. 800 (1929) with
Smith v. Schreiber, 93 Colo. 497, 27 P.2d 491 (1933), and Strauss v.
Boatright, 160 Colo. 581, 418 P.2d 878 (1966). In the latter case the
fact that rents paid during the optionee's possession were not applied
to the purchase price seems most persuasive in establishing the con-
tract to be a true lease and option as opposed to a sale and security
arrangement.
21 Blackstock v. Robertson, 42 Colo. 472, 94 P. 336 (1908); Borcherdt v.
Favor, 16 Colo. App. 406, 66 P. 251 (1901).
22 Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 165 P. 265 (1917). In Rocky Mountain
Gold Mines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten, Inc., 104 Colo. 478, 93 P.2d
973 (1939), the fact that the realtor involved had received compensa-
tion was a factor in the court's conclusion that a sale contract, and not
an option, had been entered into by the parties.
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given period of time to accept the contract. This creates an
"option" in the owner-seller for such period of time for which
he, the possible seller, has given no consideration.2 3 If accepted
by the seller, the contract provides that time is of the essence,
and that, if the buyer fails to perform any condition as required,
the contract will be null and void and the seller will retain the
earnest money deposit as liquidated damages. The document
contains a firm obligation to buy on the part of the purchaser
if the seller exercises his "option," but there is a spectacular
omission of any firm covenant on the part of the seller to sell,
albeit there are covenants that he will execute a deed and
deliver possession.
From the face of these form documents, it would appear
that termination of the contract is the only remedy for default
for either the buyer or the seller. Such being the case, the
agreements would appear to create a hybrid type of option even
after execution by the seller, or, in effect, an option springing
from an option. That is, the parties still have alternative rights
either to consummate the contemplated purchase and sale, or to
forfeit or return the earnest money, as the case may be, and be
free of any further obligation. Clearly, it is arguable that the
buyer retains the choice of defaulting and forfeiting his deposit,
thereby nullifying the contract instead of performing.
However courts may have previously assessed such agree-
ments, the door now seems to be closed fairly tightly against a
party's avoiding his obligation to convey (and possibly to buy)
once the other party has fully met or tendered his obligations.
The case of Coppom v. Humphreys2 4 embraced a situation where
the buyers had tendered their contractual obligations to a recal-
citrant seller. With considerable force, the Colorado Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Groves, compelled the
seller to specifically perform in equity, thus planting a sense of
duty where none grew before.
There are persons who have so far outgrown their catechism as
to believe that their only duty is to themselves.
Samuel Johnson
II. EXERCISING THE OPTION
Of those Colorado cases which deal with option arrange-
ments, the majority involve determining whether the conditions
of a given option have been properly satisfied or exercised,
thereby converting the option arrangement into a contract of
23 See text p. 284 supra.
24 171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970).
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purchase and sale which may be specifically enforced.
The basic rule in Colorado as elsewhere is that an optionee
must strictly meet the conditions of his option in order to
validly exercise the option and to maintain an action compelling
the optionor to perform.25 Consequently, if the option agree-
ment requires written notification of exercise, verbal notice
has been held legally insufficient.26 Failure to render payment
or to timely meet any other condition is also fatal to the
optionee's rights. 27 If the agreement is silent as to when and
where an act must be performed, Colorado courts have some-
times implied a reasonable time and place for performance.28
However, to omit a time certain for the exercise, or a definite
term for the existence of an option, may be to expose the
agreement to an assault under the rule against perpetuities.2 9
If an option agreement requires that payment of part or all of
the purchase price be made concurrent with the act of exercise,
notice alone of an intent to exercise, without payment, will
not satisfy the agreement.3 0 Neither will the existence of a
dispute as to the amount which should be paid relieve the
optionee from the duty to tender payment.31
Conditions precedent to exercise and conditions concurrent
with exercise may be expressly or impliedly waived by the
optionor; and, if clearly waived, the optionee will be granted
specific performance against the optionor.32 Some of the Colo-
rado cases show a surprising tendency to hold that acts on the
part of the optionor constitute a waiver or extension as to the
time limit placed upon the optionee's right of exercise, even in
the absence of new consideration by the optionee for what is,
in effect, an extension of his option period. 33 These cases, how-
ever, largely represent situations where the conduct of the
2 5 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5
Colo. 302 (1880), are the leading cases on this point in Colorado.
26 T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo.
App. 1970- not selected for official publication).
27 Strauss v. Boatright, 160 Colo. 581, 418 P.2d 878 (1966).
28 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Tallman v. Smith,
112 Colo. 217, 148 P.2d 581 (1944); Boyd v. McElroy, 105 Colo. 527, 100
P.2d 624 (1940); Beckman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68, 49 P.2d 262 (1926).
29 Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960).
30 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963); Howard v. Inter-
state Dev. Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
31 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963).
32 Williams v. Gulick, 170 Colo. 347, 461 P.2d 211 (1969); Dreier v. Sher-
wood, 77 Colo. 539, 238 P. 38 (1925). See Coppom v. Humphreys, 171
Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970) (but, query, is an option really present
in this case?).
33 Phares v. Don Carlos, 71 Colo. 508, 208 P. 458 (1922); Wishered v.
Noonen, 71 Colo. 218, 205 P. 530 (1922); Poertner v. Razor, 500 P.2d 989
(Colo. App. 1972- not selected for official publication).
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optionor was such as to estop him from demanding strict ad-
herence to the original time limit. The normal rule is that the
option period cannot be extended without additional valid con-
sideration, and that an extension without such consideration
creates merely a revocable offer.3 4 Because of this rule, the
sound practice would be for an optionee to always pay a sig-
nificant sum for an extension of his option period, despite the
equitable relief of a gratuitous extension which sometimes
appears in the Colorado cases.
Either by a deliberate act of the optionor or by other
causes, valid acts of exercise are often rendered impossible of
performance. Frequently, the difficulty stems from the fact
that the option agreement itself is simply not clear as to what
are the mechanics of exercise. In such ambiguous option situa-
tions, the courts have held that the optionee can protect his
rights under his agreement and be in a position to demand
specific performance if he manifests an unqualified determina-
tion to exercise his option.3 5 Similarly, if acts of the optionor
delay or obstruct the optionee in his attempts to validly exer-
cise the option, the optionee can preserve his rights to specific
performance by clearly demonstrating an intent to be bound to
purchase the property involved.SB Should there be clear evi-
dence that a tender or attempt to exercise would be a useless
act, and if that fact is known to the optionee, tender of exercise
may be excused. T Nonetheless, prudence would dictate that
even in such situations the optionee make a clear demonstration
that he has committed himself, without condition, to proceed
with the purchase. Unqualified tender -somewhere, somehow
-is the best way to demonstrate such determination; it cures,
as well, many of the infirmities that may have infected the
initial option agreement.
38
Acts done in part performance of, or in reliance on, the
contract of purchase and sale which would flow from an exer-
cise of the option may also serve to constitute an exercise of
the option. This allows the optionee to seek specific per-
formance, particularly where such acts were instigated, or
34 8A G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 4444, at 264 (repl.
1963).
35 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Abrahamson v.
Wilson, 131 Colo. 580, 284 P.2d 662 (1955); Howard v. Interstate Dev.
Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
36 Howard v. Interstate Dev. Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
37 Coppom v. Humphreys, 171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970); Ruark v.
Peterson, 30 Colo. App. 162, 491 P.2d 75 (1971).
3 8 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964).
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acquiesced in, by the optionor.39
The wise man knows that the very polestar of prudence lies
in steering by the wind.
Baltasan Gracian
III. ENFORCING THE OPTION- BREACHES AND REMEDIES
The most common act of breach of the option by the op-
tionee, as indicated, is the failure to perform some act or con-
dition of the option by the time or in the manner required.
4 0
Where this occurs, the remedy of the optionor is generally to
declare the optionee's rights at an end, freeing the optionor of
any future duty to convey the property in question pursuant
to firm contract rights.4 This is generally all that is desired
by the optionor. If his title is under cloud from the option, the
court decree which runs against the optionee to void the option
will clear title. In any event, a recorded option will cease to
give constructive notice one year following the date specified
for conveyance.
42
Conversely, in the normal case of a defaulting optionor,
his default lies in his refusal to acknowledge that the option
was validly exercised and that the optionee is entitled to spe-
cific performance of the contract of purchase and sale which
arises after exercise. In such situations, the remedy for breach
generally sought by the optionee is specific performance
of that contract.43 A peculiar situation sometimes arises when
the optionee has cause to believe his optionor cannot or will not
ultimately perform specifically if he, the optionee, should
exercise the option. At least in one such situation, a declara-
tory judgment was successfully sought to test the air around
the option. 44 The caveat here, however, is that the courts have
often refused to evaluate a party's ability to perform until and
unless the time for such performance arrives.4 5 Patience, then,
may be the only answer in such situations.
Adopt the pace of nature; her secret is patience.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
CONCLUSION
Despite the clarity with which most Colorado cases speak
to each specific question the option agreement presents, the
3, Coppom v. Humphreys, 171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970); Shull v.
Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo.
129, 314 P.2d 707 (1957); Byers v. Denver Circle R.R., 13 Colo. 552, 22
P. 951 (1889).
40 See text p. 288 supra.
41 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908).
42 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-11 (1963).
43 Beckman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68, 249 P. 262 (1926).
44 Wysowatcky v. Francis, 483 P.2d 1353 (Colo. App. 1971).
45 Abrahamson v. Wilson, 131 Colo. 580, 284 P.2d 662 (1955).
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decisions do not either fully adopt or fully reject the option
as a defined and blooded member of the contract family. That
being the situation, one has to wonder why usage of the option
arrangement persists and grows. Probably, it is because deal-
making circumstances often need the latitude options offer,
and because the law in its grace (and it is a graceful science)
recognizes that need.
When used, the option indicates that the prospective seller
half does and half does not wish to sell, and that the prospec-
tive buyer is similarly uncertain or undetermined. Otherwise,
either or both would insist upon a firm contract of purchase
and sale. Obviously, for those who like certainty in their lives,
the firm contract route is the preferred path. Prospective sell-
ers and buyers usually fare better when they make their con-
tractual commitments at that point and upon those terms on
which their minds have fully met. There may be unhappy
moments for all concerned before they bite the bullet and
close the sale, but there is a certainty about it that, in the
overall, lightens everyone's load.
It is seldom very hard to do one's duty when one knows what
it is, but it is often exceedingly difficult to find this out.
Samuel Butler

